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This study is an examination of three proposals for a "causal joint" model of God's
action in the world. Adapting the thought of Austin Farrer and David Burrell, the author
seeks to show how these hypotheses are theologically flawed. The flaws stem from an over-
emphasis on the doctrine <:)/"cieatio continua. Without an affirmation of both creatio ex nihilo
and creatio continua, the latter is mistakenly removed from its theological context and adds
unnecessary incoherence to the doctrine of creation.
Seven-year-old Amy asked her Sunday
School teacher, "How did God make the uni-
verse?"
Her teacher atiswered, "God said, 'Let it
be' and there it was."
Not satisfied Amy retorted, "All right then,
but how does God keep it all going?"
Her teacher responded, "Well, I guess God
hasn't stopped saying 'Let it be' yet."
hi this exchange. Amy distinguishes be-
tween God's creative action and God's sub-
sequent sustaining activity. Unknowingly,
Amy stumbled upon the traditional distinc-
tion between the doctrine of creatio e.x nihilo
(creation out of nothing) and the doctrine of
creatio continua (continuing creation).
The dialogue between science and reli-
gion, though still acknowledging the impor-
tance of creatio e.x nihilo, currently focuses
almost exclusively on creatio continua. Much
of the current discussion addresses the ques-
tion of God's action in the world. Namely,
how may God's activity in the world be un-
derstood without reducing God to a deus e.x
machina or a god-of-the-gaps?
Some key participants in this dialogue con-
sider the search for the mode of divine action a
quest for a "causal joint" between God and the
world. These thinkers look for physical pro-
cesses open to God's non-energetic influence
and capable of accounting for large-scale
changes in the course of the world. The scien-
tists and theologians involved in this quest in-
sist that nothing less than the rationality of the-
ology is at stake. Polkinghorne states it this way:
[ll]nderslandings of divine action will
have about them the common feature
that they are not irrational accounts of
the whimsical acts of a celestial
conjurer, but they arc deeper manifesta-
tions of God's utter faithfulness and
consistency....'
Thus, to avoid the impression of irrationality,
theology must explain how God acts in the
universe within the divinely created natural
laws. For Cliristian theologians and scien-
tists involved, the causal joint appears to rep-
resent the best chance of harmonizing the dis-
coveries of contemporary natural science with
traditional Christian theology.
Yet, does a successful causal joint pro-
posal truly solve the problem of harmony be-
tween natural science and Christian doctrine
of God? It is my contention that the causal
joint quest is influenced by an overemphasis
on creatio continua, thus compromising the
traditional Christian doctrine of God. In this
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study, I shall first examine the causal joint
hypotheses offered by John Polkinghorne,
Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke. Then,
I shall look at Austin Faner's rejection of the
causal joint argument. Finally, I shall explore
how an affimiation of creatio e.\ niliilo and
creatio contiiuiu can prevent placing the
Christian doctrine of God in jeopardy.
Divine action according to chaos
theory
John Polkinghorne contends that chaos
theory presents a viable solution to the causal
God does not intervene in the world, though,
because no energy is added to it. Instead,
they maintain that God transmits informa-
tion to the world in a non-energetic manner
that in turn manifests the divine will.
joint quest. Chaos theory is a mathematical
explanation of hypersensitive nonlinear sys-
tems passing through a strange attractor, with
the effects amplified into macrophysical
events, hi other words, chaos theory is an
effoH to explain systems that are effected by
the minute changes in their initial conditions
and are thus magnified as different possibili-
ties on the macrophysical level. Chaos theory
mathematics may seem to create the impres-
sion that these systems are entirely determin-
istic if only the entire detail of their initial
conditions is known; however, Polkinghorne
asserts that chaos theory does not represent
deterministic events but rather an ontologi-
cal openness in nature.
-
The basis for Polkinghorne's contention
for the ontological openness of nature lies in
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle,
which made the epistemological
assertion of ihc simultaneous
unknowahilily of both position and
momenlum, has been widely inlcr-
prelcd as a principle of indelerniinacy,
with the ontological implication that
quantum entities do not possess at all
limes definite positions and mo-
menta.^
Polkinghorne argues that the world has an
indeterminate character. This background
material informs his concept of chaos theory
as it relates to divine causality.
As explained above, a chaotic system
passes through the strange attractor 's phase
space (its range of future possible states)
and thus manifests itself in a physical event.
The different trajectories through the
attractor all correspond to the same total
energy level. So, the
radically different
forms present at the
macrophysical level are
understood to have
arisen from the smallest
disturbances that push a
system through one
path instead of another
at the initial condition level. Polkinghorne
explains:
It is this sensitivity that produces the
intrinsic unpredictabilities. In a critical
realist rc-interpretation of what is going
on, these epistemological uncertainties
become an ontological openness,
pemiilling us to suppose that a new
causal principle may play a role in
bringing about future developments.^
This leads Polkinghorne to two critical con-
clusions. First of all, since there is no input
of energy into the system that affects paths
tlirough the strange attractor, something else
must be the distinguishing factor for their de-
velopment. Polkinghorne describes this fac-
tor as an infe)rmation input. '^ Secondly, even
though the system is being nudged at the
smallest level possible, its effects are seen at
the largest physical level. Polkinghorne says
that this forces the entire system to be viewed
in a holistic manner, because "the systems'
vulnerability to disturbance means that they
can never be isolated from the impact of their
total environment."''
If the behavior observed in nature is in-
terpreted in an ontological manner, an open-
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ness in which God may act within creation
can be seen. This openness operates at the
level where the strange attractor needs an in-
formaticMi input to choose one path over an-
other. According to Polkinghorne, this is
where God supplies an input of information.
Polkinghorne calls this divinely supplied in-
put "active information." It can best be ex-
plained by a human analogy. The mental in-
tention a person has to raise an arm is the ac-
tive information that causes the person's arm
physically to move.^ For Polkinghorne, then,
this interpretation allows God to act providen-
tially in creation without creating an additional
input of energy into the world.
The physical world is subtle and supple
in its constitution, h is open lo causal
iniluencc by the exchange of energy
between its constituent parts (as
described by physics) and also to the
operation ot holistic pattern-forming
agencies which can be thought of as
'active information' (prcsenlly not
described in detail).'*
The quantum mechanical alternative
For another causal joint hypothesis, I shall
now turn to Nancey Murphy.'' Like
Polkinghorne, she interprets the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle in a manner that allows
for an indeterminate view of nature. Unlike
Polkinghorne, however, she explains God's
divine activity in the world through the use
of quantum mechanics. She argues that quan-
tum events may be amplified by quantum
mechanics in such a way that they may be
seen at the macrophysical level.
According to the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle, events at the quantum level cannot
be predicted. Probabilities of quantum events
can be predicted, but not the specific times of
their occurrence. Since the time when a quan-
tum event will occur cannot be predicted,
Murphy asks whether there are factors that
influence when an event will actualize:
Is the when: ( 1 ) completely random
and undetermined; is it (2) internally
determined by the entity itself: is it (3)
externally determined by the entity's
relations to something else in the
physical system: or, finally (4) is it
determined by God?'"
To help distinguish these options more clearly,
Murphy presents the analogy of Buridan's ass.
Buridan, the medieval philosopher, hypoth-
esized that if a starving donkey stood equi-
distant between two equal piles of hay, it
would starve to death, because it could not
decide which pile to eat. No external factors
can help the donkey make its decision because
the piles are equal, and no internal factors can
tilt the decision one way or the other. What
factors, then, motivate a quantum event to
"choose" its actualization?
No scientific considerations point to in-
ternal or external factors that nudge quantum
entities to choose one actualization over an-
other. Thus, Murphy eliminates options 2 and
3, concluding that only 1 and 4 are truly vi-
able options. Buridan believed the donkey
would starve to death if not provided a suffi-
cient reason to pick one pile over the other.
Murphy asserts that science holds the same
"sufficient reason" intuition and. hence, has
problems accepting randomness as the deter-
mining factor of quantum events." There-
fore, Murphy contends that God is the deter-
mining factor between the quantum level
"piles of hay." "To put it crudely, God is the
hidden variable." '-
Murphy argues:
God's governance at the quantum level
consists in activating or actualizing one
or another of the quantum entity's
innate powers at particular instants, and
that these events are not possible
without God's action."
Through a scientific bottom-up rendering of
nature. Murphy concludes that since God gov-
erns at the quantum level, God must also be
involved in all events at the macro level. In
other words, these quantum level events ac-
cumulate in such a way as to "perfonn" the
divine intention.'"*
Peacocke's holistic approach to
divine action
Although Arthur Peacocke views the uni-
verse in the same open manner as those in the
above discussion, he does not explicitly settle
on a causal joint. He makes this argument:
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Defining the problem as that of the
'causal joint' between God and the
world is inappropriate, however, lor it
does not do justice to the many levels in
which causality operates in a world of
complex systems multiply interlocking
at many levels and in many modes. '^
Therefore, Peacocke describes the interaction
between God and the world as a "whole-part
intluence." "" By this Peacocke means that
...the state of the system-as-a-whole
could itself properly be regarded as a
causal factor influencing events in the
"lower" subsystems, constraining them to
follow one course rather than another.'^
In other words, God interacts with the world
in such a way that the world system as a whole
is in God, and, thus, also its constituent parts.
Peacocke 's model denies pantheism and em-
braces panentheism. Although the world lives
in God, it is still "ontologically distinct from
God." "* Because God interacts with the world
at "this supervenient level of totality," God
acts in the world in "whole-part" or "top-
down" manner, without disrupting physical
laws found at any level of the universe.'''
Since seeking for a causal joint makes less
sense in a holistic framework, Peacocke de-
velops a whole-part analogy of divine agency
modeled on human agency. For Peacocke,
To a scientist , the notion that science
might allow a recognition of the means
by which divine action directs the world
is intoxicating.
then, the way the human brain works in influ-
encing the whole body at the level of the in-
dividual neurons to produce bodily actions is
comparable to the way God influences the
world system.
According to this suggestion the stale of
totality of the world-as-a-whole (all-
that-is) would be known maximally
only to the omniscience of God and
would be the field of the exercise of the
divine omniscience at God's omnicom-
petent level of comprehensiveness and
comprehension.-"
Hence, just as we consider ourselves personal
agents who exhibit a unifying type of intlu-
ence over our bodily actions, so too should
we think of God as "a unifying, unitive source
and centered intluence on events on the
world."''
Although he says that a causal joint is
not visible from humanity's viewpoint,
Peacocke asserts that there must be a divine
transfer of information to the world in an
analogous manner to the brain directing the
body. Infonnation transfer can be consid-
ered non-energetic, and therefore avoids the
problem of an interventionist God. In fact,
Peacocke argues that to affirm this non -en-
ergetic transfer is "to accept the ultimate, on-
tological gap between the nature of God's
own being and that of the created world, all-
that-is apart from God."" So, while using
language that suggests he is not searching
for a causal joint, Peacocke has still described
the means by which he understands God must
interact with creation and, thus, has joined
the quest for the causal joint.
What does all this mean?
What, then, do these three causal joint hy-
potheses describe? They offer an account of
an open universe. In other words, these think-
ers have completely re-
jected the notion of a uni-
verse that is ruled by a
deistic God or an inter-
ventionist God. The idea
of an open universe, they
assert, helps with an un-
derstanding that the
world, in a sense, "makes
itself."-'' This understanding allows an ac-
commodation to the current evolutionary
model presented by modern natural science.
These thinkers argue that the universe must
in some manner be open, if God is to interact
immanently with creation. God does not in-
tervene in the world, though, because no en-
ergy is added to it. Instead, they maintain that
God transmits information to the world in a
non-energetic manner that in turn manifests
the divine will.
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The divine will, however, at no time com-
promises the freedom God has given creation.
Polkinghorne writes:
God interacts with the world but is not
in total control of all its process. The
act of creation involves divine accep-
tance of the risk of the existence of the
other, and there is a consequent kenosis
of God's omnipotence.^'*
Polkinghorne is swift to observe that creation
does not impose this kenosis upon God, but
rather that God chooses self-limitation. Also,
because the universe makes itself,
Polkinghorne says that there is a kenosis of
divine omniscience. Peacocke explains what
this means with the following example. He
says that if there are a million radium atoms
set to disintegrate in the next 10"^ seconds,
God does not know exactly which or how
many atoms will remain intact after that. God,
like us, knows only the probability of how
many atoms will remain after the given time.-'^
The self-limitation concept has led
Peacocke to argue that God is "an Improviser
of unsurpassed ingenuity."-'' God allows the
universe to unfold freely, yet non-energeti-
cally directs its actions. At the same time,
God, as an improviser, must be willing to
change or, in some sense, is subject to change
since the Creator respects the freedom be-
stowed upon creation. Therefore, God must
also limit the divine freedom so that creation
may enjoy its own freedom.
A prior rejection of causal joint
hypotheses
To a scientist (I, myself, spent my under-
graduate years in a biology laboratory), the
idea of unraveling the causal joint mystery is
terribly exciting. The notion that science might
allow a recognition of the means by which
divine action directs the world is intoxicat-
ing. Scientists contend that the quest for the
causal joint seeks only to sharpen human
awareness and appreciation of how God works
within the creation. As stated above, those
involved in the quest feel a strong need to
show that God rationally works within cre-
ation according to divinely established natu-
ral laws. Yet, is it necessary for scientists to
demonstrate the rationality of God's interac-
tion within creation? To discern this, I shall
examine Austin Farrer's objection of the use
of the physical sciences to model divine action.
Then I shall examine the concept of God that
Farrer says follows a divine causation model.
To determine whether or not physical sci-
ences are up to the task of modeling divine
action, the first question to ask is. What is the
goal of the physical sciences? Since Francis
Bacon, the physical sciences concentrate on
performing experiments with the intent of ob-
jectively describing observations. The de-
scriptions are written in the language of math-
ematics. Moreover, because of the physical
sciences' use of mathematics as their descrip-
tive language, observable events must be
quantifiable and repeatable. In other words,
the physical sciences describe the data of re-
peatable events in such a way that they can
be summarized by mathematical equations.
After these equations are accepted as accu-
rate, scientists construct models that help pre-
dict future natural events. These models are
accepted as true explanations for how nature
works, unless and until another set of events
and related equations prove them false."
So Austin Farrer asks. Can the physical
sciences model divine action? To do so would
seem to argue that divine action is both quan-
tifiable and repeatable. Farrer says that this
is absolutely untrue. In a detailed explication
he maintains:
The inapplicability of the model offered
by physical method seems scarcely to
need dcmonslralion. By systematic
physical interference we obtain
knowledge of the habitual action of
natural agents, a habilual action
grounded in their determinate constitu-
tions: it is only in so far as their
constitutions are determinate and their
action consequently uniform, that we
can discover anything about them by
the physical method. Unless God is a
finite determinate force, bound by
natural law, he cannot be known in this
sort of way. Experience of the physical
type can never tells us anything about
him....^**
Therefore, if a physical model is con-
structed that describes divine action, Farrer
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says that God is made out to be one force
among the many possible natural physical
forces. Thus, he argues that this is not the no-
tion of God maintained in the Christian tradi-
tion, for this is a god whose causality is ex-
plained, whose mysteries have been solved,
and whose sovereignty has been breached.
Hence, Farrer declaies that the "physical model
reveals its inadequacy by blotting out the very
subject we come to study, the divine."-''
Secondly, Farrer argues that the physical
sciences severely limit our model of God.
According to Farrer, the god described by sci-
ence is a finite force defined by created laws
of nature. Also, if God works through a causal
joint, divine power will be limited in order to
leave space for creation to act freely, for God
has to restrict the divine power and divine
knowledge so that creation's freedom might
remain unfettered. In other words, creation
limits God. We iire supposed to take com-
fort, however, in the thought that the God's
limitation is self-imposed.'" How is it com-
forting, though, if God has to reduce the di-
vine being in order to interact with a free cre-
ation? Does this not imply that human free-
dom and divine freedom are in competition?
Farrer has rejected the quest for the causal
joint because he understands it to change radi-
cally the Christian doctrine of God. By blot-
ting out the divine, the physical sciences have
replaced God with a force that has limited
power over creation. Consequently, human
freedom and divine freedom are left to com-
pete. Yet, this is not what either Christian
theologians or scientists involved in the causal
joint quest are seeking to describe. There-
fore, it must be shown how a proper under-
standing of both crcatio e.\ iiihilo and creatio
continiia will not compromise the traditional
doctrine of God.
What do we mean by creation?
When seeking to discern the fundamental
relationship between the Creator and creation,
one turns to the Christian distinction between
creatio ex nihilo and creatio continiia. Creatio
ex nihilo articulates the Cliiistian idea that God
created the world out of nothing—not a pool
oif some kind of nothing, but nothing at all.
Creatio ex nihilo thus implies creation's de-
pendence upon God for every moment of its
existence and, simultaneously, the affimiation
that "God is no more God for creating."^' This
qualification is essential to creatio ex nihilo,
because the world's dependence on God for
existence alone could be misinterpreted as
creation being an eternally necessary emana-
tion out of God. So, creation must be regarded
as a divine gift of grace rather than something
that occurred necessarily. Yet concurrently,
creation does not take away from or add to
God's perfection, "though it adds to what there
is—as in transfinite arithmetic, where infin-
ity plus a definite amount equals infinity." '-
Although creation is a free choice by God, it
is not an arbitrary one. Christian theology
maintains that God's decision to create the
universe is consonant with the divine nature,
but not necessitated by it.
Hence creation can be utterly gratuitous
without its needing to be conceived as a
"free choice", as though "God could
have done otherwise.""
Creatio continiia "encompasses not only
the idea that the act of creation is a continu-
ing process, but also the continuing sustenance
and involvement of the Creator in regard to
the physical world." '^ This, however, cannot
be separated from creatio ex nihilo. Ted Pe-
ters contends that a healthy Christian theol-
ogy needs both creatio ex nihilo and creatio
continiia.''^ Woltliart Pannenberg explains:
The creatio continuata formula
presupposes the strict conception of
creation as creatio ex nihilo inasmuch
as it characterizes God's preserving
activity as the continuation of the
creation out of nothing. For this reason
alone the idea of a continuing creation
cannot be set in oppositit)n to the
creatio ex nihilo formula."'
Peters says that the contemporary science-
and-religion discussion has led many theolo-
gians to concentrate more heavily on creatio
continiia than creatio ex nihilo, leading some
to forsake the latter." Theologians use the
modern scientific interpretation of the uni-
verse as dynamic and continually evolving to
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reenergize and concentrate solely on the doc-
trine of creatio continita. Peacocke says:
The scientific perspective on the world
and life as evolving has resuscitated the
theme of creado continita and consider-
ation of the interplay of chance and law
(necessity) led us to stress the open-
ended character of this process of the
emergence of new forms. ^^
Does the divine action of conserving cre-
ation, though, fundamentally differ from the
action ofcreating out of nothing? David Buirell,
relying on Thomas Aquinas, helps in understand-
ing what it means to say that "God creates."
Aquinas offers us a handy formula:
there is no difference hetween God's
conserving activity and God's creating,
other than the proviso that creating
presumes noihina at all to be already
present (ST l.KM.l).'"
In other words, divine activity is defined by
divine creating. Burrell says further that if
this formula is added to Thomas' theorem,
"...the proper effect of the universal
cause of all things is things' existing" (ST
1 .45.5), then God's activity in the world
is ever an instance of or a consequence of
bestowing existing ((W.u')-'"'
By creating, therefore, God gives existence
to something; and by conserving it, God con-
tinues to give it existence.
In causal joint hypotheses, though, God's
conserving action is not characterized by cre-





istence on creation, but
seeks, rather, to offer it
direction. This divine
input of information
may be depicted as
non-energetic inter-
vention. Burrell, however, says that God
should not be thought of as intervening, "since
creating cannot be represented as another vec-
tor added to the configuration of forces in the
universe."'" Therefore, without asserting that
God's conserving action is the same as the
divine creating action, causal joint support-
ers imply that existence is the "floor" upon
which the Creator works."*'
To do this, though, would be to deny the
fundamental proposition of crcatio ex nihilo.
Creatio e.\ nihilo says that the world is con-
tingent upon God for its being—it does not
exist at all on its own. Causal joint propo-
nents do not deny this. Nevertheless, when it
is argued that God's creative and conserving
action are not the same, the doctrine of creatio
e.\ nihilo is jeopardized by implicitly positing
that God interacts with a world that is not com-
pletely under divine control. In other words,
when creatio ex nihilo is compromised, God
is made to work on the floor of existence and
consequently compelled to input information
into a world that is independent of the divine
being for its existence. Therefore, God is
forced to improvise with the materials pro-
vided by creation.
The consequence of misconstruing creatio
ex nihilo is to cause God's freedom to com-
pete with creation's freedom. Polkinghorne
argues:
This gift of crcaturely freedom is costly,
for it carries with it the prccariousness
inherent in the self-restriction of divine
control."*'
Is self-limitation, then, the only option for
God? Instead of focusing their efforts on de-
picting divine freedom, theologians should
When creatio ex nihilo is compromisedy
God is made to work on the floor of exist-
ence and consequently compelled to input
information into a world that is indepen-
dent of the divine beingfor its existence.
concentrate energy on understanding
creation's freedom. Creation's freedom is a
contingent freedom and, therefore, a limited
freedom. Yet, as T. F. Torrance says, "It is no
less free because it is limited. Unlimited free-
doin of a contingent universe would be a con-
tradiction in terms." ^ Creation's freedom is
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contingent on God and consequently is lim-
ited only by the divine freedom. If creation's
freedom exists only because of divine freedom,
how are they in competition? To imply that
God limits the divine freedom in order to make
creation tiaily free is to deny that creation's free-
dom is contingent upon the Creator.
Where has this led?
The goal of the causal joint argument is to
clarify an understanding of God. Causal joint
proponents argue that scientific findings can
complement traditional Christian theology
about God. Further inquiry shows that this is
not accurate. Firstly, a review of Austin
Farrer's objection to the causal joint debate
showed that the physical sciences cannot model
divine action without reducing God to a quan-
tifiable, repeatable, and finite force. Secondly,
I have shown that the causal joint quest relies
much too heavily on a truncated notion of
creatio continua. This then leads to the exclu-
sion of fundamental parts of creatio ex nihilo.
As a result, creation no longer depends com-
pletely on God for existence, but waits, rather,
for occasional divine inputs of information.
The uncertainty of creation's contingence upon
God, then, has caused subsequent confusion
about the relationship between creation's free-
dom and divine freedom. This confusion has
led causal joint supporters to argue for a self-
limited God. Ultimately, then, causal joint in-
sights have been shown not to clarify the doc-
trine of God, but rather to render it incoherent.
Where then has this led? Is the causal joint
question truly insoluble? While this may be,
as Polkinghorne states, "too intellectually
despairing an attitude to take,""''* it may be
the only acceptable attitude if one is tnily con-
cerned with maintaining the core of the tradi-
tional Christian doctrine of God. For both
creatio e.\ nihilo and creatio continua must
be affirmed; any understanding of God as the
Creator is dependent upon it. God the Cre-
ator creates by bestowing existence and con-
serves creation by continuing that original
bestowal of existence—God does not merely
input infonnation into an already existing sys-
tem. Undoubtedly, this is a very difficult pill
to swallow for some involved in the science-
and-religion dialogue. Yet, they should take
comfort in the idea that the God who remains
mysterious is the God who should be praised.
Therefore, no one should disparage Amy's
teacher for a seemingly naive attitude; instead,
one should be joyfully consoled by those wise
words, "I guess God hasn't stopped saying
'Let it be' yet."
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